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Abstract—Mobile IPv6 has been developed for quite a few
years now, but it has yet to bring its constant connectivity
and global reachability benefits to mobile devices in real world
scenarios, mainly due to lack of trouble-free and secure network
access and data transmission for devices as they roam. In
this paper we propose a Unified Architecture that combines
the strengths of Mobile IPv6 and AAA services and closes
the gap between the Mobile Node and the Access Network’s
requirements. Our approach provides a comprehensive solution
in a setting where users require seamless roaming, secure network
access and secure data transmission in a dynamic fashion as
they commute, whereas Access Networks require powerful AAA
services without compromising their security policies. The qual-
itative and quantitative evaluation of our Unified Architecture
through thorough laboratory tests, demonstrate the efficiency of
our approach and highlight its potential and suitability for real
world deployment in the current Internet architecture.
Index Terms—Mobile IPv6, AAA, Security, Host Mobility
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of mobile devices, varying from PDAs to
smartphones, tablet-PCs, notebooks or laptops, that people use
every-day to obtain Internet connectivity as they commute, has
been largely increased to tens of millions during the last two
decades. It is without doubt that this number will continue to
increase in the near future and more and more people would
like to get advantage of Internet connectivity on-the-go, and
be able to do all their every-day online tasks on-demand, no
matter where they are, from their mobile devices.
From a networking perspective, when a mobile device
(also referred onwards as Mobile Node - MN) connects to
a wireless Access Network (AN), it obtains an IP address that
is topologically correct and allows the device to transmit and
receive packets to the global Internet. A mobile device at the
hands of a commuter who, for example, goes to his office
in the morning, will high likely have to connect to quite a
few different wireless ANs and also try to roam from one
to another as quickly and seamlessly as possible to facilitate
the user’s connectivity requirements. However, following the
principles of the IP protocol, when a MN associates to a new
AN, it has to change its current IP address, thus causing its
connections and in turn its applications’ sessions to break,
causing nothing but frustration to its user. Mobile IP, being
Mobile IPv4 [1] or Mobile IPv6 [2], has been developed for
a few years now to facilitate this MN’s roaming, also dubbed
as host mobility, and provide efficient roaming, seamless con-
nectivity and global reachability for the MN, no matter where
its point of attachment is or how frequently it roams. Mobile
IP guarantees that a roaming MN is constantly reachable at its
address on its Home Network (HN), by mapping it with any
new IP address the device acquires when connecting to a new
AN, thus providing great benefits to roaming users.
However, Mobile IP is not seeing large scale real world
deployment and thus does not benefit commuters because,
in our opinion, secure network access for MNs and secure
transmission of their data via the AN are not ensured. Mobile
IP was designed with the goal to provide constant connectivity
for a roaming user, and assumes that the user has an easy way
to quickly connect to any available Access Points (APs) even
from different ANs. To make things more difficult, nowadays it
is not enough for a roaming MN to just connect to an available
third party wireless AP and obtain untrusted connectivity;
secure network access to the AP is a necessity. In addition, a
MN requires secure transmission of its data, both locally, in the
vicinity of the wireless AP that is connected to, and globally,
as data leave the wireless network and travel to the Internet.
Although more and more ANs are nowadays configured to
provide secure access and transmission of data, the problem
still exists and lies in the fact that MNs cannot establish a
trustworthy association with the AN quickly and in a dynamic
fashion, and allow them to perform their security configuration
automatically and unobtrusively to the user. Authentication,
Authorization and Accounting (AAA) procedures can provide
solutions to the aforementioned problems where users require
seamless roaming, secure network access and data security in
a dynamic fashion, and ANs require granting and maintaining
secure and authorized network access to and for the MNs,
whilst keeping accounting records.
This paper describes a Unified Architecture (UA) that
combines the strengths of Mobile IPv6 and AAA services to
satisfy the requirements of both the MNs and the ANs. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
the motivation behind our research and Section III gives
some background information on its cornerstones. Section
IV provides the design of our UA and Section V evaluates
qualitatively and quantitatively our approach. Finally, Section
VI concludes this body of work and highlights its benefits.
II. MOTIVATION
In order to describe the motivation behind this work, let us
discuss a real-life example that reveals the current problems
and explains the reasoning and motivation behind our research.
Let us consider a stockbroker who commutes from his house
to his office every day, by doing a short walk through the
town centre, then taking the train for a twenty minute ride to a
station where the company’s van is going to pick him up with
other fellow employers and take them to the office. During
this morning ride the stockbroker uses his Internet enabled
PDA to learn the news that affect the stock market worldwide
and get prepared for the business day. Therefore, during this
ride he constantly listens to the news from an online streaming
radio service, he skims the headlines of a few news portals, he
checks the rates of important shares in foreign stock markets
and he replies to some clients’ emails, all, over the Internet.
It is apparent that as the stockbroker commutes from his
house to the office he requires constant, uninterrupted and
reliable Internet connectivity from the different ANs he en-
counters during this morning ride. It is also evident that he
needs secure network access quickly and trouble-free, without
him having to configure different type of credentials to comply
with the variety of authentication mechanisms the different
available ANs he encounters on his way to his office require.
Ideally, the stockbroker’s device would like to dynamically
establish some sort of trust with the ANs it connects to,
so that he would avoid being connected to freely available,
but deceitful ANs, that would try to sniff his authentications
credentials and hack into the transmitted packets. At the same
time, the stockbroker’s device would like to be granted secure
network access in an authenticated way, without revealing
its identity directly to the AN, for privacy purposes. Finally,
he also requires secure data transmission and reception over
the wireless medium, no matter what AN he uses to acquire
connectivity from or how frequently he roams.
On the other end, AN providers need some incentive for
setting up and administering wireless networks in towns or
transportation means that would allow commuters to acquire
connectivity from. Financial benefits is always an important
incentive for providers, however it should not compromise
the need for strong security policies. ANs require a way to
authorize clients and account their network usage according
to their own AAA policies. Providing secure and authorized
access and transmission of data on their networks is very
important for ANs, not only because clients will favor these
networks compared to insecure ones and will agree to pay for
using them, but also in order to prevent unauthorized users
to perform illegal activities over theirs networks. Therefore,
ANs require well configured and refined AAA procedures
for all the MNs that require access. At the same time, is is
unrealistic to expect that all different ANs would have the
appropriate means to authenticate all roaming users requesting
network access. Therefore, efficient and reliable cooperation
of providers is also required for a robust service, which can
be established based on Service Level Agreements (SLA)
between the cooperating parties.
However, the reality today goes against the aforementioned
requirements of both the MN and AN. Although the number
of publicly available APs from ANs nowadays is increasing,
not only are they not open and free for use by commuters,
but they require in advance configuration with different types
of credentials according to each AN’s AAA and security
policies. The lack of a standardized authentication method
in conjunction with the plethora of types of authentication
credentials, varying from a username and password pair, to a
one-time key or use of certificates being issued by different
certificate authorities, makes the problem even worse. In this
setting of troublesome authentication, where an individual has
to spend a considerable amount of time configuring its device
instead of being benefited from Internet connectivity, Mobile
IP cannot even begin to operate and provide seamless and
constant connectivity when the user roams, since the user
cannot get trouble-free network access in the first place. The
requirement of secure data transmission after the user is con-
nected to an AN is an additional ordeal, as the user has to set
up certain security configuration on his device (e.g. preshared
keys) according to the policies of each AN, which again,
makes him spending time on configuration instead of his actual
task. The reality from the AN’s point of view, is that instead of
having a cooperative and secure architecture among different
ANs that satisfies the users’ connectivity requirements whilst
offering secure AAA procedures and financial benefits to the
AN, we observe a competing setting which is, eventually, more
expensive and less efficient for the ANs. ANs end up in trying
to set up and administer as many APs as possible, in an effort
to lure as many users as possible, and neglect the fact that they
will never achieve full connectivity in all places, neither will
have a database with all the possible roaming users requesting
network access. A more cooperative model where both the AN
and the HN that a user originates from get financial benefits
without compromising their security and AAA procedures, and
at the same time, the user has the opportunity to experience
constant, trouble-free and secure connectivity as he commutes,
is required, and will bring benefits to all parties involved.
III. BACKGROUND
This section introduces the cornerstones of this research
work; Mobile IPv6, IPsec, the Radius AAA protocol, TLS
based authentication methods and wireless security protocols.
A. Mobile IPv6
Mobile IPv6 is designed to facilitate host mobility and
allows a MN that moves from one network to another to
maintain seamless connectivity and be constantly reachable
via a permanent IPv6 address, even though it changes its point
of attachment and has to change IP addresses as it roams.
Mobile IPv6 provides seamless host mobility and maintenance
of transport and application layer connections to a roaming
MN, by transparently maintaining a binding between two
differently scoped IP addresses, namely a Home of Address
(HoA) and a Care of Address (CoA). The HoA is a permanent
IP address that has been assigned to the MN at its own
Home Network (HN), and the CoA is the IP address that
the MN obtains when visiting a Foreign Network (FN) (term
interchangeably used with AN), which is any other network
than its own. The binding between the HoA and the CoA is
maintained by a mobility agent at the MN’s HN, dubbed as
Home Agent (HA), which is responsible to keep track of the
MN’s mobility using a registration procedure. Every time the
MN roams to a new AN and acquires a new CoA, it sends a
Binding Update (BU) to its HA containing that address. The
HA after validating the contents of the BU, it stores its data in
a binding table and sends a Binding Acknowledgment (BA) to
the MN to denote a successful binding. A successful binding,
automatically establishes a bi-directional tunnel between the
HA and the MN, over which all the future traffic will occur
(as illustrated in Fig. 1). Onwards, every packet sent from a
Correspondent Node to the HoA of the MN will be intercepted
from the HA and redirected using tunneling to the CoA of the
MN dictated by an entry in the HA’s binding table. If the MN
roams to another AN, then the only task it should perform in
order to maintain its connectivity, would be to deregister its
previous CoA and repeat its registration procedure with the
CoA it obtained from the AN it just connected to.
Fig. 1. Data Transfer in Mobile IPv6
B. IPsec
IPsec [3] is a protocol suite for establishing secure IP
communications between peers (hosts or gateways) over an
insecure network. IPsec uses a combination of different pro-
tocols to provide mutual authentication, data confidentiality,
data integrity, non-repudiation and anti-replay protection in a
per packet basis without any regard to the communication path
between parties. IPsec mainly uses three different protocols;
IKE, AH and ESP. IKE is used to exchange cryptographic
keys among peers, establish the Security Associations (SA)
among them for inbound and outbound traffic per peer and
negotiate all the cryptographic algorithms and parameters of
the secure communication channel that IPsec will operate
upon. AH and ESP cryptographic protocols are used in two
different modes, transport mode, where protection is provided
from the Transport layer and higher, and tunnel mode, where
protection is provided for the whole packet. The exact protocol
and mode used is determined from the requirements of the
application scenario. Both [3] and [4] discuss the use of IPsec
in Mobile IP scenarios and mandate its use to avoid attacks
such as man-in-the middle, hijacking, passive wiretapping or
impersonation attacks. ESP in transport mode is mandated to
protect control traffic between the MN and the HA in both
directions, whereas ESP in tunnel mode could optionally be
used to protect all the application traffic the MN generates and
is being sent via the AN the MN is connected to. This is the
IPsec configuration which we will follow in our UA.
C. RADIUS AAA Protocol
The RADIUS AAA protocol [5], which we will be using in
our UA, is the most well known and widely deployed AAA
protocol worldwide. Its functionality is build on the generic
AAA framework defined in [6] and mainly involves three
entities; the user’s device (supplicant), the Network Access
Server (NAS) and the AAA server (Fig. 2).
The process for performing a AAA service for a wireless
device using RADIUS is as follows (see Fig. 2). When a
device requests network access it uses a Layer 2 protocol (such
as PPP or EAP) to communicate with the NAS and, among
other information, to send to it its authentication credentials.
The chosen authentication method (e.g. EAP-TLS, PEAP etc.)
will define the number of packets that should be exchanged
for the authentication of the client, in addition to the type
and format of the authentication credentials (e.g. a hashed
password, a certificate etc.). Since the NAS has no appropriate
means to authenticate the supplicant itself, it consists of a
AAA client implementation that is responsible to collect all the
information the supplicant sends in e.g. EAP frames, convert
it to Attribute Value Pairs and encapsulate them in AAA
packets. In turn, these packets will be encrypted with a strong
key the NAS shares with the AAA server and finally send
these packets to the server. When the AAA server receives
these packets, it authenticates the supplicant using the chosen
authentication method, and optionally, with the aid of other
resources, such as local databases or a PKI. If authentication
is successful then the RADIUS server tries to authorize the
user by checking its authorization policies which are, usually,
ISP specific. When the AAA server reaches a decision whether
the user should be granted or denied access to the network, and
sometimes comply with specific configuration requirements
of the supplicant (e.g. provide an IP address from a certain
address pool), it replies using AAA packets to the NAS, which
is then responsible to relay the AAA’s reply to the supplicant
over Layer 2 frames. When this phase is completed, the user
is granted (or denied) access with a defined authorization level
and the AAA server starts collecting accounting information
for the supplicant’s network usage from the NAS, using
specific accounting messages that update the AAA server in
regular intervals.
Fig. 2. Authenticating and Authorizing a MN using RADIUS
D. TLS based Authentication methods
There are more than 40 EAP based authentication methods
that can be used in conjunction with a AAA protocol, which
will encapsulate the data found in EAP frames into appropriate
AAA messages and transfer them from the NAS to the AAA
server. However, EAP authentication methods that are based
on a Transport Layer Security Tunnel, such as EAP-TLS,
EAP-TTLS, PEAP or EAP-FAST and others, appeal more to
our research not only because they are more secure, but also
because they bring significant advantages to roaming users.
During Phase 1 of such an authentication method, the AAA
server is authenticated to the end client (supplicant) and then a
secure TLS tunnel is created between them, which is then used
from the client to submit its own authentication credentials.
This process maintains the client’s privacy by preventing it
to reveal its identity and credentials to an intermediate AP
or AN, and ensures that these are transmitted to the AAA
server only over the tunnel they have established. Of particular
importance for our research are EAP-TLS [7] and EAP-TTLS
[8]. During Phase 2, when the AAA server authenticates the
client, EAP-TLS uses a client’s certificate, whereas EAP-
TTLS uses a password in a hashed format, usually dictated by
an additional authentication mechanism such as CHAP. One
important advantage that EAP-TLS and EAP-TTLS offer to
roaming users, is the ability to skip completely Phase 2 of
the authentication process if the user has been authenticated
with the AAA server before. This feature is called Session
Resumption (SR) and when is enabled at the AAA server,
when an end client is authenticated fully with the AAA server
once, the latter keeps a unique entry in its cache for that client.
Therefore, when the node roams to another AP requesting the
same authentication procedure to occur, after completion of
Phase 1 the AAA server realizes that it knows the user based
on its cached entry from the previous authentication of the
client and thus skips Phase 2. SR brings significant advantages
for roaming users as the need for transmitting extra packets
back and forth for a full authentication might be costly both
in terms of time and money. SR speeds up the authentication
process even though the user might have been roaming to a
new AP, with which it has not performed an association before.
E. Wireless Security
The need for securing wireless networks is much higher
when ANs deploy APs publicly to offer connectivity for
commuters. The WiFi Alliance in the process of defining
the 802.11i standard has designed WPA and WPA2 protocols
to secure wireless networks by offering packet encryption,
message integrity, protection against replay attacks and au-
thorized network access with the use of cryptographic al-
gorithms. WPA and WPA2 protocols support two different
authentication modes; Personal mode and Enterprise mode.
When Personal mode is used, wireless clients can connect to
an AP using a preshared key (PSK), whereas when Enterprise
mode is used, much more complex authentication schemes
can be supported since authentication is performed with the
aid of a AAA backend server. One of the big advantages
of the Enterprise mode of WPA2, is that after successful
authentication, the wireless client and the AAA server are the
only owners of a Master Key, which they then use to derive
a Pairwise Master Key (PMK). The PMK is then sent from
the AAA server to the AP in a secure AAA message, and
is being used as a symmetric key, bound to the session of
the AP and the client. With the knowledge of the PMK, a
subsequent 4-way handshake is performed between the AP and
the wireless node, that derives, binds and verifies additional
operational keys that are used in the future communication of
the node with the AP. This significant feature of WPA2 in
Enterprise mode means that session keys are being securely
derived and negotiated in a way that security is enhanced
and preconfiguration is avoided. One additional advantage that
the aforementioned key derivation procedure brings to mobile
users, is that when an roaming node connects to a WPA2
AP, it firstly checks if it has a collection of keys, called PMK
Security Association (PMKSA), that can be used with this AP.
If this information has been cached from a previous association
of the wireless client with the AP, then there is no need for
a full authentication procedure with a AAA server, but only
the 4-way handshake has to be performed locally between the
AP and wireless client. PMKSA caching significantly speeds
ups the authentication procedure of the roaming client without
compromising the security of the network.
IV. DESIGN & CONFIGURATION
In order to be able to bridge the gap between Mobile IP
and AAA services, we created a unified design that combines
the respective architectures and satisfies the requirements
of all parties involved. Fig. 3 presents our devised Unified
Architecture (UA) where we overlay the AAA model in its
extended form for roaming users [6], over Mobile IPv6’s
architecture and integrate them in a unified way. According
to our design, the HN of a MN now consists of the HA that
is responsible to provide the Mobility service for the MN
while it is away, and the AAA Home Server (AAAHS) that is
responsible to provide the AAA service when the MN roams
to foreign ANs. Conceptually, the HN represents either a small
home network at the house of the owner of the MN, or his
organization’s network or his ISP that provides these services
for the MN while commuting. The AN on the other hand,
represents any network that the MN could encounter during
its commuting that can provide Internet connectivity usually
over an AP that projects a wireless hotspot in the vicinity the
MN roams. The AN (also known as Foreign Network) consists
of its own AAA Foreign Server (AAAFS) and many APs that
act as NASs for the AN and are able to exchange packets with
the AAAFS. Conceptually the AN could be a small cafe at a
town’s centre offering WiFi connectivity to its customers, or
a bigger University campus’ WiFi network or even a publicly
available WiFi municipally network, being offered by static
hotspots scattered in a town or moving ones installed in public
transportation offering connectivity to commuters.
It is important to emphasize that our UA does neither
augment nor alter the design of the AN itself, making our
devised UA ready to be used in the current Internet in-
frastructure. What our UA requires though, is that the AN
has a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the HN of a
MN, through which, the AAAFS has the ability to relay the
authentication process to the MN’s AAAHS, which evidently
has more appropriate information for authenticating the MN.
This provides important benefits to all parties involved, as the
AN does not require to know the MN in advance, neither has
to have any preconfigured information about it. In addition,
if a TLS based authentication method is being used the MN
avoids revealing its identity and credentials to the AN itself, as
its authentication data are forwarded securely to its HN over
a tunnel, after the initial authentication of the AAAHS to the
MN (as described in Subsection III-D). If the authentication
procedure is successful, this means that the AAAFS has a
secure partnership with the AAAHS dictated by the SLA
and confirmed from the knowledge of the shared secret that
they use to secure the AAA packets they exchange, thus, the
MN can trust the AN’s AP. ANs have financial incentives
to get SLAs with HNs because these would allow them to
serve MNs that are away from their HNs and in turn bill
them appropriately for the provided service. On the other end,
HNs are interested in getting SLAs with as many ANs as
possible because the latter will serve their users when they are
away from ”home”, inducing financial benefits to both network
providers and bigger connectivity coverage and support for the
end users. Our UA does not oblige the establishment of SLAs
between all small-scale networks, on the contrary, it can easily
facilitate a hierarchical model where only big ISPs have SLAs
between them and through them accommodate the smaller
networks they provide connectivity for. This model is simply
fitted into our UA by introducing a chain of intermediate AAA
servers of the involved ISPs in the path between the AAAFS of
the AN and the AAAHS of the HN. According to this model,
each AAAFS will play the role of the proxy AAA server and
will forward packets to the next AAA server in the chain until
data reach an ISP that has a partnership with the MN’s HN
and is able to finally route these packets to the MN’s AAAHS,
leading to a model that scales for the real world.
Let us now consider the phases a MN has to go through
from the time it starts roaming to a new AN until it obtains
full Internet connectivity. According to our design, in order
for the MN to become fully operational it has to perform its
Layer 2 handover, its AAA communication as required by
RADIUS and the chosen TLS based authentication method,
its mobility tasks as required by Mobile IPv6 and its security
related configuration, as required by the local AP and the use
of IPsec for MNs. These occur sequentially in the following
three distinct phases :
• Phase 1 - Layer 2 Association : The MN performs the
Layer 2 association with the AP of the AN it roams to.
• Phase 2 - Layer 2 & 3 AAA Communication and
WiFi Security Configuration : During this phase the AN
will perform the AAA procedure with the MN using RADIUS
protocol according to the procedure described in Subsection
III-C. Since the MN does not have an IP address yet, its
communication with the AP occurs using EAP frames that
carry all the required information using Layer 2 (MAC)
addresses. As discussed previously, the AAA client imple-
mentation of the AP, converts the data from EAP frames to
AVP attributes which are encapsulated in IP AAA packets
and are sent to its AAAFS. According to the requirements of
a TLS based EAP authentication methods, which we choose
for our UA, the initial packets that are sent from the MN
should reach its AAAHS server over a TLS tunnel. In order
to accomplish this, in these initial packets the MN presents
its ”identity” to the AP by complying to the standardized
Network Access Identifier (NAI) (defined in [9]). Therefore,
the network access request from the MN should contain the
domain name of the HN it originates from, in the form of
”anonymous@homenetwork.com” and thus enables the local
AAAFS identify where it should forward all the AAA packets
to. When the AAAFS relays the initial authentication data to
the MN’s AAAHS, the latter forms a tunnel with the MN
and carries out the full authentication process by exchanging
a lot of packets back and forth according to the chosen au-
thentication method. When the authentication process finishes,
the AAAHS replies to the AAAFS of the AN, and then
the later according to the authentication reply either grants
network access to the MN or denies it. Authorization usually
occurs after authentication and is strictly related to the actual
policies the AN and HN have in place for roaming users.
When authentication and authorization finish, and if the MN
has been granted access, the MN derives secure session keys
for its communication with the AP as described in Subsection
III-E, and the AAAFS starts the accounting procedure for the
MN and updates the AAAHS with billing records sent in a
batch format at a regular interval.
• Phase 3 - Layer 3 Mobility & IPsec configuration: If
the MN successfully finishes Phase 2 and is granted access,
it obtains a topologically correct IPv6 address by contacting
a DHCPv6 server or configures it by listening to Router
Advertisements. When the MN has an IPv6 address, its first
task is to perform its mobility binding with its HA and
at the same time to enable its IPsec configuration so that
each packet it transmits is secured by IPsec according to the
configuration defined in [4]. As described in Subsection III-B,
at this moment, the MN configures its security associations
and applies its IPsec policies to ensure that its control traffic
to and from its HA will be secured by ESP in transport mode
and all its subsequent traffic will be secure by ESP in tunnel
mode. Therefore, to successfully finish Phase 3 the MN sends
its secured BU to the HA and waits for the matching BA that
denotes a successful binding and a fully operational MN.
V. EVALUATION
This section describes a qualitative and quantitative evalu-
ation of our proposed UA.
A. Qualitative
Our UA brings significant benefits to both the roaming MN
and the AN that serves it. Section II discussed the motivation
Fig. 3. The devised Unified Architecture
behind our research. Here we revisit the presented motivation
and detail it in requirements that are satisfied with our solution.
Our UA satisfies the following requirements of the MN :
1) Secure, unobtrusive and trouble-free network access :
a) The user does not need to configure different types
of credentials according to the requirements of each AN
the MN is visiting, since the actual AAA procedure is
performed with its AAAHS and this configuration is
known to the MN in advance.
b) The MN does not reveal its identity to each AN it is
visiting, thus keeping its privacy while roaming.
c) The MN establishes trust dynamically with the AP it
is connecting to, by relaying this task to its HN when the
AAA procedure is being carried out. If its AAAHS does
not trust the AAAFS when the latter forwards packets
to the former, the AAA process fails and thus the MN
does trust the AN’s AP.
2) Secure transmission of data locally, in the vicinity of the
AP using WPA/WPA2, and globally, as data leave the
AN and travel to the Internet using IPsec.
3) Constant, uninterrupted and reliable connectivity is pro-
vided with the use of Mobile IPv6, which in conjunction
with the trouble-free network access that is provided
using the AAA service, leads to seamless and quick
roaming for the MN.
Our UA satisfies the following requirements of the AN:
1) Authentication of the MN without requiring to have
information about it in advance. The AN relays the
authentication procedure to the MN’s network that has
more appropriate information to authentication the MN.
2) Authorization of the MN according to its policies.
3) Accounting of the MN for its network use in order to
bill the HN of the served MN appropriately.
B. Quantitative
Having discussed the theoretical benefits that our architec-
ture introduces by bringing together Mobile IPv6 and AAA,
we wanted to evaluate the real potential of our approach on our
experimental testbed by carrying out a series of Tests in order
to evaluate the applicability and efficiency of our approach.
In this Section we describe the hardware and software setup
of our testbed, the tests that we carried out and finally, we
analyze and discuss the results observed.
1) Hardware and Software Testbed Setup: To evaluate the
capabilities and performance of our architecture we configured
the testbed illustrated in Fig. 4. The testbed configuration
consists of three Access Networks (AN1, AN2 and AN3), a
laptop acting as a MN and the HN the MN originates from.
All PCs of our testbed have a P4 2.8GHz CPU, 2GB RAM
and a 80 GB hard drive and run Ubuntu 10.04 LTS. Each AN
consists of two PCs being connected over Ethernet, one of
them acting as an AP by projecting a 802.11g wireless hotspot,
using a D-Link DWL-AG530 wireless network card running
the ath5k driver, and the other acting as the AN’s AAAFS. The
desktop PC operating as AP runs the hostapd deamon version
0.7.3 that is configured in WPA1-Enterprise mode for AN1
and WPA2-Enterprise mode for AN2 and AN3 to allow us
experiment with different wireless AP configurations. The HN
has also two Linux desktops that are connected over Ethernet
using a Cisco router, one of them acting as a HA by running
the Mobile IPv6 stack from [10] in HA configuration and
the other acting as the AAAHS. All the AAA Servers of our
testbed, run the FreeRadius AAA Server version 2.1.10 and
each of the AAAFSs have a shared secret with the AAAHS
in order to communicate with it securely. All the equipment
of our testbed is IPv6 enabled. AN1 and AN2 are connected
with the HN over Ethernet using the native IPv6 support of
our laboratory, whereas we decided to connect AN3 with the
HN over the Internet using an IPv6 Tunneling service from HE
Tunnel Broker [11]. This IPv6 tunneling approach introduces
approximately 315 ms delay (630ms roundtrip) and routes all
the packets from AN3 to HN and vice versa via the Internet,
using global IPv6 addresses. This technique ensures that our
tests are being carried out not only on a local basis, but
also over a long distance route over the Internet that present
real-time traffic characteristics in the communication, such as
congestion and delay. The MN used for our tests runs the
Mobile IPv6 stack from [10] being configured in MN mode,
with the appropriate IPsec configuration that matches the one
at its HA. In addition the MN runs WPA supplicant version
0.7.3 to allow the node to connect to the APs and perform all
the AAA related tasks and local WiFi security configuration
according to the chosen authentication method. Finally, we
created a Certificate Authority and issued certificates with
2048 bit keys for all the FreeRadius Servers and the MN to
be used during the authorization phase of the tests.
Fig. 4. Experimental Testbed
2) Testing Sets: The aforementioned testbed setup allows
testing to take place via APs that have different configuration
and over different routes, mimicking how communication
would take place in an actual deployment scenario where a
MN roams from one AN to another. To perform a thorough
evaluation of our UA we decided to perform four different
Tests, each of which consisting six Stages representing six
roaming movements from one AP to another. Each Stage
consists the three Phases the MN has to perform before it
becomes fully operational as described in Section IV. The
focus of our Tests is to see how fast these Phases are
performed, i.e. how quickly the MN becomes fully operational
using different authentication methods and configuration over
our UA. Therefore, we repeat each Test 50 times and detail the
average timing it takes for each of these Phases to complete
on each Stage of each Test, and present them individually in
Tables II, III, IV and V in the following Subsection.
The Tests we performed on our testbed are as follows;
Test 1 uses EAP-TLS without SR, Test 2 uses EAP-TLS
with SR, Test 3 uses EAP-TTLS without SR and finally,
Test 4 uses EAP-TTLS with SR. For all our Tests Layer
2 handovers (Phase 1) and Layer 3 MIPv6 and IPsec tasks
(Phase 3) remain the same, whereas Phase 2 is different on
each Test according to the chosen authentication method. Each
Test includes six roaming movements from one AP to another
which are presented in Fig. 4 in blue arrows, associating
the MN with AP1, AP2, AP3, AP2, AP1 and finally AP3,
representing the six Stages respectively. We decided to per-
form the aforementioned roaming movements because they
demonstrate realistic scenarios, where an individual might
connect repeatedly to an AP or swap from one AP to another
repeatedly. Reconnecting to the same AP, or connecting to
a new one that will eventually communicate with the same
AAAHS at the MN’s HN, demonstrates how useful features
such as PMKSA caching of WPA2 and SR of EAP-TLS and
EAP-TTLS are.
3) Results: Table II shows the recorded results from Test
1 where the MN used EAP-TLS and performed all Stages
by roaming from one AN to another as presented in Fig. 4.
During Stage 1 of this Test, the MN connected to AP1 and
performed its Layer 2 association (Phase 1) in approximately
3.9 seconds. Then, all the EAP-TLS exchange of packets
(Phase 2) was carried out in approximately 0.587 seconds,
which is remarkably low, since this phase requires 23 packets
to be exchanged in total. As Table I presents, 7 out of the 23
packets are transmitted locally between the MN and the AP,
and 16 are transmitted ”globally”, following a 3 hop route from
the MN to the AN’s AP, then to the AAAFS and finally, to the
MN’s AAAHS. After successfully carrying out Phase 2, Phase
3 was performed in approximately 1.63 seconds for Stage 1
of Test 1, where the MN performed its binding successfully
and securely, and configured its IPsec policies to secure any
future application traffic. The MN became fully operation
when all Phases of Stage 1 finished, i.e. in approximately
6.121 seconds in total. In Stage 2 of Test 1, the MN roamed
to the WPA2 AP2, and experienced similar results although
transmitting 2 less local packets. Stage 3 consists of the MN
being connected to AP3, where all the Phase 2 packets are
routed to the AAAHS of the MN’s HA over the IPv6 tunnel to
Hong Kong. The tunnel overhead increased Phase 2 timing to
an average of 5.198 seconds, almost 10 times more compared
to the time it took for Phase 2 to complete in previous Stages.
This is an expected delay as 16 packets have to travel using
the IPv6 tunnel that adds 315ms per packet transmission.
Approximately a 600 millisecond increase is also observed
during Phase 3 of this Stage, as now the BU and BA of the
binding the MN performs, also travel over the tunnel. The
results from Stage 4, where MN roams to AP2 where it has
been connected before in Stage 2, illustrate the benefits of
PMKSA caching of WPA2, as the MN does not perform a full
EAP-TLS authentication, but just a 4-way handshake. With
PMKSA caching Phase 2 of Stage 4 completes in just 0.035
seconds, almost 20 times less when compared to the observed
0.615 seconds timing of Stage 2 when the MN connected to
AP2 for the first time, leading to a considerably lower total
timing for this Stage. Stage 5 is where the MN connects to
AP1, where, although it has been connected to before, as it
is a WPA1 AP, it does not support PMKSA caching and thus
records similar timings with Stage 1. Stage 6 further affirms
the advantages of PMKSA caching, as Phase 2 completes
only in 0.018 seconds despite the tunnel setup to Hong Kong,
since only the local 4-way handshake is required. Due to
PMKSA caching, 17 packets less are being exchanged in Stage
6 compared to Stage 3, which leads to a total 5.978 seconds for
this Stage, considerably lower than the overall 9.684 seconds
required in Stage 3. Regarding Phase 1 timings (Layer 2
Handovers) of this Test, we observe that they vary from 1.756
seconds to 3.904 seconds, which is reasonable if we take into
account the interference and variation of signal strength levels
of the different APs in our testbed. Regarding Phase 3 timings
of this Test, results were very consistent varying from 1.630
seconds to 1.874 seconds with the addition of approximately
630 ms in Stages 3 and 6 where the tunnel was used.
Test 2, repeats Test 1 but with the Session Resumption
feature enabled at the AAAH Server at the MN’s HN. As Table
III presents, Stage 1 of this Test presents similar results with
Stage 1 of Test 1 as nothing has in fact changed for this Stage.
However, during Phase 2 of Stage 2 the AAAHS realized that
the MN had performed a successful authentication with it some
minutes ago (during Stage 1) and thus skips the second part of
the EAP-TLS procedure. As Table I presents, only 8 packets
compared to 16 are exchanged in Phase 2, which completes in
only 0.064 seconds, almost 10 times less compared to the same
Stage of Test 1 when SR was disabled. Further demonstration
of the benefit of using SR is illustrated in Stage 3, where
again only 8 packets are transmitted over the tunnel and thus
the time it takes for this Phase to complete gets halved to 2.5
seconds compared to Test 1. Stages 4 and 6 of this Test present
the same results as Test 1, due to PMKSA caching. During
Stage 5, SR affirms its advantages again, with a significant
reduction of Phase 2 timing down to 0.093 seconds compared
to 0.474 seconds of Stage 5 of Test 1, since PMKSA caching
is not applicable as AP1 is in WPA configuration. Phase 1 and
Phase 3 timings of Test 2 remain at similar values compared to
Test 1. Overall, it has to be noted that the SR feature, where
applicable (Stages 2, 3 and 5) has demonstrated significant
advantages and reduction in Phase 2 timings compared to Test
1 and further improved the overall timings of the Stages where
PMKSA caching was not applicable.
To further evaluate our UA we repeated Tests 1 and 2 using a
different authentication method, namely EAP-TTLS, that uses
a username/password pair to authenticate the MN instead of
a certificate. As Table IV shows Phase 2 timings in this Test,
were slightly decreased in Stages 1, 2 and 5 where the full
authentication was performed with the AAAHS, although the
number of ”global” packets now required for EAP-TTLS are
more, i.e. 20, compared to 16 in EAP-TLS (see Table I). This
decrease is attributed to the less time it takes for the AAAHS to
process the inner packets of EAP-TTLS compared to those of
EAP-TLS packets that contain the client’s certificate. During
Stage 3 of Test 3, we observe an expected increase of the
timing of Phase 2, as now more packets have to travel over
the IPv6 Tunnel and thus the additional delay is reflected in the
results. However, once again, Phase 2 timings of Stage 4 and
Stage 6 are remarkably low (0.015 seconds and 0.009 seconds
respectively) thanks to PMKSA caching which prohibits the
need for any ”global” packets exchange. Generally, it can be
stated that the overall timings of this Test remain at the same
level of Test 1 with slight differences due to the difference of
the authentication method being used.
Finally, Test 4 repeats Test 3 with SR being enabled at
the AAAHS of the MN’s HN. All the overall timings of this
Test (Table V) are decreased compared to those of Test 3, as
both Session Resumption and PMKSA caching are triggered
where applicable. In particular, Phase 2 timings for Stages 2, 3
and 5 are remarkably low (0.048 seconds, 0.029 seconds and
0.095 seconds respectively), because SR reduces the number of
”global” packets that needed to be exchanged from 20 down
to 8 (see Table I). Phase 2 of Stages 4 and 6 of this Test,
required only 4 local packets to be exchanged, compared to
27 in total for a full EAP-TTLS authentication, because again
PMKSA caching was enabled and ensured that only the 4-way
handshake was performed.
# of Packets TEST 1 TEST 2 TEST 3 TEST 4
Stage 1 7/16 7/18 7/20 7/20
Stage 2 5/16 5/8 5/20 5/8
Stage 3 5/16 5/8 5/20 5/8
Stage 4 4/0 4/0 4/0 4/0
Stage 5 7/16 7/8 7/20 7/8
Stage 6 4/0 4/0 4/0 4/0
TABLE I
LOCAL/GLOBAL NUMBER OF PACKETS FOR PHASE 2
XXXXXXXPhases
Stages ST.1 ST.2 ST.3 ST.4 ST.5 ST.6
Phase 1 (sec.) 3.904 3.728 2.168 1.756 3.636 3.520
Phase 2 (sec.) 0.587 0.615 5.198 0.035 0.474 0.018
Phase 3 (sec.) 1.630 1.874 2.318 1.828 1.832 2.440
Total (sec.) : 6.121 6.217 9.684 3.619 5.942 5.978
TABLE II
EAP-TLS RESULTS WITHOUT SESSION RESUMPTION
XXXXXXXPhases
Stages ST.1 ST.2 ST.3 ST.4 ST.5 ST.6
Phase 1 (sec.) 3.818 3.696 2.204 1.878 3.572 3.485
Phase 2 (sec.) 0.469 0.064 2.500 0.028 0.093 0.011
Phase 3 (sec.) 1.906 1.672 2.264 1.734 1.806 2.256
Total (sec.) : 6.193 5.432 6.968 3.640 5.471 5.752
TABLE III
EAP-TLS RESULTS WITH SESSION RESUMPTION
XXXXXXXPhases
Stages ST.1 ST.2 ST.3 ST.4 ST.5 ST.6
Phase 1 (sec.) 3.731 3.334 1.795 2.210 3.652 3.614
Phase 2 (sec.) 0.379 0.369 6.347 0.015 0.365 0.009
Phase 3 (sec.) 1.912 1.786 2.484 1.849 1.752 2.462
Total (sec.) : 6.022 5.489 10.627 4.074 5.769 6.085
TABLE IV
EAP-TTLS RESULTS WITHOUT SESSION RESUMPTION
XXXXXXXPhases
Stages ST.1 ST.2 ST.3 ST.4 ST.5 ST.6
Phase 1 (sec.) 3.773 3.561 1.818 1.811 3.572 3.553
Phase 2 (sec.) 0.481 0.048 2.503 0.029 0.095 0.009
Phase 3 (sec.) 1.554 1.536 2.326 1.848 1.754 2.440
Total (sec.) : 5.808 5.146 6.647 3.688 5.421 6.003
TABLE V
EAP-TTLS RESULTS WITH SESSION RESUMPTION
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a UA that combines the strengths
of Mobile IPv6 and AAA services and satisfies the require-
ments of both MNs and ANs that provide connectivity for
roaming users. Our UA enables roaming MNs to experience
constant Internet connectivity with trouble-free but secure
network access, and secure transmission of their data despite
their frequent roaming. Using our UA, ANs are able to provide
efficient AAA services in a secure and profitable fashion,
without compromising their security policies. Our qualitative
evaluation discussed the merits of our approach and how it
satisfies the requirements of all the communicating parties.
The results from our thorough quantitative evaluation with
two different authentication methods (EAP-TLS and EAP-
TTLS), demonstrated the performance and applicability of our
approach for a real world deployment.
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